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Abstract. Political stability is generally hailed as an asset that yields positive economic 
dividends. In particular, the macroeconomic environment is likely to benefit from 
political stability. On the other hand, the existence of a sizeable shadow (or informal) 
economy represents institutional weaknesses and may undermine the macroeconomic 
environment. The latter effect is more likely if the shadow economy reduces the 
government’s tax revenues and disturbs the balance of demand and supply for formal 
businesses. This paper tests these contradictory tendencies. Circumventing the issues 
related to reverse causality and endogeneity of the informal sector, we define a qualitative 
variable for the size of the informal sector. The qualitative variable assumes a value of 1 
for all the countries having an informal sector exceeding 25 percent of GDP on average 
over our sample period. Using a large data set of 162 countries over the 1999 to 2007 
period we find that an informal sector can undermine the positive effect of political 
stability. The results are robust against alternative specifications and satisfy the usual 
assumptions of valid empirical analysis. 
JEL Classification: O17, E52, H26, H27 
Keywords:  Political stability; Informal sector or shadow economy; Inflation; Openness; 
tax revenue.  
  
  
 
 
 
Introduction 
Despite numerous studies on the topic, the issue of inflation, particularly in 
developing countries, continues to hold the attention of economists as well as non-
economists. Inflation, particularly in developing countries, has a strong political economy 
aspect which may be studied in the context of various determinants. This study takes the 
view that one key variable which has not yet been sufficiently analyzed is the shadow 
economy. 
The shadow economy refers to those economic activities that would generally be 
taxable if they were to be reported to the authorities responsible for taxation and 
regulation.   In the context of developing countries, this variable is especially important 
because it tends to be a feature of economies that are prone to high and often volatile 
inflation. This study contends that the above relationship is rooted in a political context. 
The shadow economy influences monetary policy outcomes because it is 
associated with a larger demand for currency, and fiscal policy outcomes because it 
impacts the size of the tax net. Shadow economies are also relevant to both monetary and 
fiscal policy considerations because of the tendency of governments to use the inflation 
tax. The underlying basis for this tendency will be studied here, given the proposition that 
the shadow economy is related to the political basis for inflationary policies.   
To examine whether this is so, we empirically test the relationship between 
inflation, the shadow economy, and political stability. This is done through a series of 
regressions using a large panel data set, of 162 countries, containing qualitative as well as 
quantitative variables.  
This study posits that an analysis that includes a third variable, the shadow 
economy, can add an important dimension to the relationship between political stability 
and inflation. From this the following hypotheses may be derived; that political stability 
reduces inflation; and, that it does so to a lesser extent in the presence of a large shadow 
sector. The use of a carefully selected set of additional regressors confirms that the 
estimates are robust to controlling for other macroeconomic and institutional indicators 
associated with inflation.  
These findings are consistent with recent, as well as older literature on the 
political economy of inflation.  This is so because two very prevalent discussions related 
to inflation pertain to time inconsistency and seigniorage respectively.  Political stability 
 
 
is of course related to issue of credibility arising from the rational expectation that 
policies will be time inconsistent. Alesina and Stella (2011) provide an overview of the 
literature. Similarly, seigniorage and political stability are related because less stable 
governments are more likely to pursue inflationary policies, especially those arising from 
fiscal profligacy and corruption.  
More details on both of these discussions are highlighted in the literature review, 
which is the next section. Following that we will present the salient features of our 
research design, data, and methodology. Subsequent sections contain our empirical 
results, and conclusions.  
 
Literature Review 
There are numerous determinants of inflation ranging from purely economic, such 
as persistent budget deficits, to purely non-economic, such as natural disasters. In a 
monetary economy based on fiat money there is no automatic nominal anchor such as a 
gold standard. So both economic and non-economic factors can generate the speculation 
that strengthens expected inflation. The issue is thus; how to fill this void and keep 
expected inflation within a pre-determined comfort zone.  One solution grind out of the 
debates concerning benefits of discretionary versus rule based policy is the institutional 
structure called central bank independence, which is based on the findings of Kydland, 
Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). 
However, as noted by Cukierman (1992), the negative relationship between CBI 
and inflation does not hold for developing countries. Here, weak institutional structures 
arising from unobserved economic activity (known as a shadow or informal economy), 
corruption, and the lack of de facto CBI may explain this deviation. This is the context in 
which this study seeks to contribute to the literature; by looking beyond CBI for the 
causes of high and persistent inflation in some economies. 
The case for independent central banks became well known in the 1990s and 
formalized when New Zealand became the first country to implement CBI1 . Within a 
decade a number of central banks in other developed as well as developing2 economies 
had been given autonomy. This of course did not translate to falling inflation in each 
                                               
1  See Cukierman (2008) and Alesina and Stella (2011) for review of literature. 
2  The State Bank of Pakistan became independent in 1994 
 
 
case. Hayo and Hefeker (2002) are of the view that studies that link CBI to low inflation 
incorrectly assume CBI as exogenous, when in fact it should be considered endogenous. 
Complementing this insight, Robinson et al., (2008) provide evidence that de facto 
institutional reforms are not sufficient to achieve the objective of low inflation unless 
backed by the requisite level of political will.  
These observations offer a partial explanation of why developing countries, 
including those with formally independent central banks, continue to face high inflation. 
Such varying inflation outcomes draw attention to other possible determinants of 
inflation. One of these is openness, which was posited by Stanley Fischer (1982), to share 
a negative relationship with inflation because the loss of seigniorage by fixing the 
exchange rate puts political pressure on domestic policymakers to increase fiscal 
discipline. Using the time inconsistency framework, Romer (1993), builds upon 
Rogoff’s3 (1985) observation that surprise monetary expansion results in a currency 
depreciation which moderates the inducement to expand. So, inflation and openness are 
negatively related because openness provides a check on the policymakers incentive for a 
monetary expansion. 
Romer’s (1993) evidence was reinforced and extended (for example in Campillo 
and Mirron (1997) and Lane (1997) using large cross sectional data sets),  to find that the 
negative relation between openness and inflation holds for developing economies as well 
and that CBI is not the most important determinant of inflation. Terra (1998) argues that 
the negative relationship in Romer (1993) may be due to high debt burden which is an 
omitted variable in Romer’s analysis. Less open economies need a larger devaluation to 
generate the trade surplus required for debt repayment and this raises the domestic cost of 
external liabilities, requiring a larger private to public sector transfer. Given weak tax 
revenue collection, this transfer will be in the form of an inflation tax. Al-Nasser et. al 
(2009) use a large panel dataset for 1950-1992 and find that the  inflation-openness 
inverse relationship is not restricted to a time frame or set of countries. 
Political instability has been used in some studies as a variable to examine the 
determinants of inflation. This is an extension of the time inconsistency literature and is 
also a useful point to begin a discussion about optimal tax considerations. Roubini and 
                                               
3 Rogoff (1985) built upon the KPBG model to introduce the notion of the “conservative” central banker 
who would be more inflation averse than welfare maximizing, and hence overcome the inflation bias. 
 
 
Sachs (1989) find that larger deficits are associated with political factors, departing from 
previous work on budget deficits which attributed them to tax smoothing hypotheses 
based on the equilibrium model of fiscal policy4.  
A similar point is made by Cukierman et. al (1992). They find that more unstable 
or polarized political systems are more prone to scenarios where the revenue collection 
capabilities of a government are constrained deliberately by inefficient tax systems.  A 
similar discussion about deficit bias is carried out by Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011) 
where it is argued that debt accumulation may be strategically used as a constraint, placed 
by the current regime on future governments. This is related to Campillo and Miron’s 
(1997) finding of a positive relationship between political instability and inflation; 
possibly because political instability makes it less easy for policymakers to commit to 
low inflation, also because countries with more political instability face a higher optimal 
inflation tax because of higher underground activity, and additionally because political 
instability is likely to translate into weak policies causing a divergence of “natural and 
socially optimal output and unemployment rates”.  
Similarly, Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1989) posit that seigniorage as a 
source of government revenue is used more frequently in politically unstable societies 
than it is in stable and homogenous countries because given tax evasion or high collection 
costs, it is relatively easy to gather5.  
The presence of a large shadow economy6 can be inflationary because it raises the 
likelihood that public expenditures will be met through an inflation tax, which is a 
relatively easy means for the government to extract revenues from the shadow sector 
(Canzoneri and Rogers, 1991; Nicolini 1999; Cavalcanti and Villamil, 2003; and 
Koreschkova, 2006; in Mazhar and Meon, 2012).  
                                               
4 This approach is attributed to Barro (as cited in Roubini and Sachs, 1989) and argues “that actual tax and 
deficit policies are a reflection of an intertemporal optimization over a long time horizon by the budgetary 
authorities, who choose their policies to reduce the excess burden of taxation for a given path of 
government spending”. 
5 The evidence on the impact of political institutions on inflation is not unmixed. For example, Mijiyawa 
(2011) finds that democracy increases inflation if it stimulates money creation and compromises trade 
liberalization.  
6 Within the literature there is often an overlap between the description of the term ‘shadow economy’ and 
other terms such as unofficial economy, underground economy, undeclared activities, informal economy 
hidden economy, clandestine activities, black economy, etc. which describe similar types of economic 
activity. For the purpose of this study it is worth noting that all of these terms involve income that is 
unreported and hence not taxed. 
 
 
There are numerous descriptions of the shadow economy. Schneider (2012) 
presents the taxonomy of underground activities7. This can be classified as either illegal 
or legal activities. Within each of these categories a distinction may be made between 
those activities that rely on monetary transactions and those that rely on non monetary 
transactions. The former category contains activities that are hidden because they are 
illegal and sometimes criminal, or even when legal, carried out by those seeking to evade 
or avoid taxes. 
A broad definition8 of the shadow economy is found in Schneider (2012); 
“unreported income from the production of legal goods and services, either from 
monetary or barter transactions – and so includes all productive economic activities that 
would generally be taxable were they reported to the state (tax) authorities” . 
The size of the shadow economy has been found to share a positive relationship 
with inflation. This is so because the inflation tax tends to be used to meet budgetary 
requirements when large sections of the economy are unrecorded and hence untaxed 
(Canzoneri and Rogers, 1991; Nicolini, 1999; cited in Mazhar and Meon, 2012). Other 
studies that discuss the optimality of the inflation tax in the context of large shadow 
sectors are Cavalcanti and Villamil (2003), and Koreschkova (2006). In their empirical 
analyses Mazhar and Meon (2012) find a positive relationship between the size of the 
shadow economy and inflation, and a negative relationship between the size of the tax 
burden and the shadow economy. The literature thus not only indicates a compelling 
relationship between inflation and the shadow economy given public debt, but also 
highlights the importance of the shadow economy as a factor that threatens fiscal 
stability.  
How does the shadow economy relate to other determinants of inflation, 
particularly those discussed earlier here? The literature that focuses specifically on the 
relationship between the shadow economy and other economic variables appears limited, 
with two notable exceptions; one of these is the studies that examine the relation between 
                                               
7 For more details please refer to Appendix 2 where a taxonomy of shadow economies as used in Schneider 
(2012) is presented. 
8 Schneider’s (2012) analysis deliberately excludes illegal activities (for instance crime including drug 
production and human trafficking) and also the production of goods and services that are consumed within 
the household, including childcare.  
 
 
the shadow economy and corruption; the other is the studies that relate the shadow 
economy to financial sector development.   
In a study that focuses on the positive relationship between inflation and 
corruption, Al-Marhubi (1999) finds that one of the reasons for the increased reliance on 
the inflation tax is the tendency of businesses to go underground in response to 
corruption. Buehn and Schneider (2011) use a structural equation model to study 
corruption and the shadow economy as distinct latent variables and find that the shadow 
economy and corruption are complementary variables. This discussion can be related to 
studies that find that inflation to be linked to political instability. This is so because the 
weak state is related to poor contract enforcement (Acemoglu, 2008) which diminishes 
the benefits of being formal (Schneider, 2012). Gordon (2005) finds that a major source 
of the differences between tax policy in developed and developing countries is the value 
of financial intermediation.   In richer countries the value added by the financial sector is 
considerable and as a result firms will choose to operate in the formal sector, hence 
resulting in a smaller shadow economy. 
Huang and Wei (2003) model corruption as the reduced ability of governments to 
collect tax through formal channels. Corruption in their study is hence used as a proxy for 
weak institutions. Among the interesting conclusions they arrive at is that an inflation 
targeting policy is sub optimal for developing countries because of the widespread 
presence of bureaucratic corruption.  Given that corruption and the shadow economy 
complement each other, it may be posited that CBI is less effective given the presence of 
a large shadow economy. This result is consistent with previous studies that examine the 
relationship between CBI and inflation (Campillo and Miron, 1997). 
A possible relationship between openness, inflation, and the shadow economy is 
mentioned by Bowdler and Malik (2005) who posit that openness increases the revenues 
obtained from taxing tradables which are easier to monitor than non tradables which will 
find it relatively easier to operate in the shadow economy9.  
 
Methodology and research design 
                                               
9 This hypothesis is developed by Bowdler and Malik (2005) in the specific context of a situation where a 
government in period of low revenues might consider other means to meet budgetary requirements.   
 
 
The above discussion sets the tone for interesting questions that necessitate the 
merging of some threads of literature. In particular, this study seeks to learn more about 
the shadow economy’s effect on inflation in a political context.  
Such a relationship may be posited as follows; politically stable regimes have less 
of an incentive to follow inflationary policies, particularly expenditures that will need to 
be financed through an inflation tax. The presence of a large shadow economy reduces 
the likelihood that the regime will not need to use the inflation tax. In other words, even 
though shadow economies reduce tax collection from non-inflationary sources, a 
politically stable regime is less likely to run a deficit requiring seigniorage revenue.  So, 
it may be asked; what type of government is less/ more likely to use the inflation tax to 
finance its expenditures; and, what are the factors that enhance the need to use the 
inflation tax? 
This discussion may be presented in the form of a set of hypotheses; 
 
Hypothesis 1: A large shadow economy increases inflation 
Hypothesis 2: Political stability reduces inflation 
 
As a corollary of above two hypotheses we also test the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 3: A large shadow economy reduces the effect of political 
stability on inflation 
 
So, the focus of this study is on the relationship between three variables. These 
are inflation, the shadow economy, and political stability. The approach used is akin to 
the ‘quasi experiment’ method discussed by Stock and Watson (2011). Here a source of 
variation is used ‘as if’ it were randomly assigned and used to examine the relationship 
between an independent and dependent variables. 
In this case, the source of variation is the shadow economy, which may be used to 
examine the relationship between inflation and political stability. A dummy variable is 
constructed with a value of 1 for those countries where the shadow economy10 is 
                                               
10 Data sources available in the next section and in Appendix 1 
 
 
consistently above 25% and a value of 0 for those countries where the shadow economy 
is consistently below 15%, over the period of analysis.  This not only insulates our 
empirics from the issues related to reverse causality that plagued the previous empirical 
studies (e.g. Mazhar and Meon, 2012) but also avoids the occurrence of discrepancies 
arising from measurement issues of categorical variables nonetheless allows us to 
adequately capture the separate influence of larger and smaller shadow economies11. As a 
result, our dataset is purged of those countries where the shadow economy range, as 
percentage of GDP, is consistently between 15% and 25%. 
The purging of the dataset allows the study to emphasize the effect on the 
dependent variable of shadow economies that are either relatively large or relatively 
small. This step is of particular use in this study where the interaction effect of the 
shadow economy and political stability will be examined. This is detailed below. 
For a second set of regressions the focus is on the interaction effect of the shadow 
economy and political stability. For this purpose a multiplicative interaction term is 
constructed using the shadow dummy and a measure of political stability12. To study the 
relationship of the shadow economy and political stability with inflation, when both 
phenomena are actively present in an economy, the marginal effects of our variables of 
interest are examined; that is the marginal effects of political stability and the shadow 
economy, on inflation13.  
For the purpose of carrying out checks of empirical robustness a set of control 
variables is prepared based on the literature reviewed earlier. The model may be specified 
as below; 
Specification 1 
Inflation = β0+ β1(Shadow economy dummy)
14 + β2(Political stability) +  
β4(Controls ) +ε 
 
Specification 2 
Inflation = α0+ α1(Shadow economy dummy)
15 + α2(Political stability)+ 
                                               
11 The median size and also the average size of the shadow economy in the dataset is 33% of GDP 
12 Please refer to appendices 
13 This is done using the margins command in STATA 12 which can numerically estimate marginal effects 
of y of with respect to x. 
14 The coefficient β0 measures the marginal effect of the shadow economy dummy variable on inflation in 
the absence of political stability (Political stability = 0).  
 
 
α3 (Shadow economy dummy*Political stability)+ α4(Control variable ) + ε 
 
Thus α3 in specification 2 allow us to capture the influence of political stability on 
inflation as a function of shadow economy. A positive significant value of α3 would 
imply that the inflation reducing effect of political stability will be diluted with an 
increase in the size of the shadow economy.  
Data and choice of variables 
We use a large panel data set of 162 countries over 1999 to 2007 period. The size 
of the dataset used ranges from 476 to 849 observations, for each specification. The 
dependent variable is inflation. The measure for this is annual percentage change in the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI), as estimated by the World Bank. For estimates of the 
shadow economy the data set prepared by Schneider et al. (2010) is used, which covers 
162 countries from 1999 to 2007. These estimates are derived using MIMIC 
methodology which is considered superior to other methods used to estimate shadow 
economy. Moreover, the estimates of Schneider et al., (2010) enjoys high correlation with 
the estimates develop using structural model of an economy (Mazhar and Meon, 2012). 
For political stability the indicator available from the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators website is used.  
Other regressors include a term to control for development; this is the logarithm 
of Gross Domestic Product per capita based on Purchasing Power Parity. This was 
obtained from the World Development Indicators dataset. It is expected that GDP will 
have a negative relationship with inflation 
Openness is also included as a control variable given its importance16, particularly 
in the time inconsistency literature, as a determinant of inflation. For this the Penn World 
Table database is used. In this, openness is calculated as the ratio of imports and exports 
to GDP. This variable is expected to have a negative relationship with inflation. 
The other control variables are institutional in nature and attempt to capture the 
propensity of policymakers to pursue objectives that are not the same as those desired by 
the public. For this purpose transparency is included using a measure of corruption which 
                                                                                                                                            
15 Ibid 
16 Particularly Romer (1993) and Campillo and Miron (1997) 
 
 
is taken from the Heritage Foundation database, based on Transparency International 
estimates is using a 10-point scale, where a higher score indicates less corruption and the 
lowest score indicates a very corrupt government. This is expected to be negatively 
correlated with inflation. 
As a further control for institutional quality, the Voice and Accountability 
measure from the Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset is used. This variable relies 
on various sources that reflect transparency, accountability, electoral process etc. to 
capture political participation and freedom. This is expected to be negatively related to 
inflation.  
Model 
The regressions are run on the STATA 12 software package and results are 
obtained using ordinary least squares with panel corrected standard errors17. Since the 
data is a large set of cross-sectional time-series, the study is exposed to a number of 
different potential estimation issues, namely heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and 
missing data. The magnitude of each of these issues varies with regression approaches. 
The approach assumed to be most appropriate is selected, but a series of robustness 
checks are conducted to determine whether the estimates reported are so fragile as to lose 
significance with a different specification. The important conclusion of the robustness 
checks is that the ﬁndings are stable, given a number of different specifications. 
 
Results 
The results are summarized in Table 1 and Table 2, which contain estimates from 
the regressions using the shadow economy dummy for size, and the regressions 
containing the interaction term respectively.  
The significance of the models is confirmed by Wald Chi-square statistics which 
allow for the rejection of the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the 
dependent variable and independent variables.  
                                               
17 The xtpcse, hetonly command in version 12 of Stata was used to run the regressions. This provides 
estimates in which the standard errors are panel corrected only for panel level heteroskedasticity 
(StataCorp, 2011). An alternative approach is to use feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). We opted 
not to use this approach based on Beck and Katz’s (1995 cited in StataCorp, 2011) finding that FGLS is 
likely to result in inaccurate standard error estimates. 
 
 
The first set of regressions indicates that the effect of the shadow economy on 
inflation is diminished in the presence of political stability. This is apparent from the 
results because the shadow economy is not statistically significant whereas political 
stability is statistically significant. This outcome is nearly consistent across this set of 
regressions as different control variables are added and removed. The single exception 
here is when openness is used as a control. In this case both the shadow economy and 
political stability are significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. To account for this 
it may be assumed that openness raises taxation revenues obtained from tradables which 
are more easily gathered than those from non tradables which will find it relatively easier 
to operate in the shadow economy, as mentioned in Bowdler and Malik (2005).  
Given the above specification, it is worth noting that the statistical significance of 
the term for political stability gives the marginal effect of political stability on inflation 
when the shadow economy is small (or non-existent). It is necessary to examine this 
prediction in more depth. 
For this purpose an interaction term is introduced. The inclusion of this (using the 
same set of control variables) indicates that the interaction term and the shadow economy 
share a statistically significant relationship with inflation, whereas the effect of political 
stability is no longer significant. The shadow economy is statistically significant in all 
specifications that include the interaction term.  This implies that the effect of political 
stability on inflation is the outcome of its interaction with the shadow economy.  
To examine this further, the marginal effects of the component variables of the 
interaction term are examined. This indicates that both variables are associated with 
inflation, though the association of the shadow economy is stronger. 
 
 
 
   
Table 1: Does shadow economy size effect inflation? 
Cross sectional regressions: Pooled Least Squares 
Dependent variable = inflation 
 1 2 3 4 
Shadow -0.645 4.733*** -0.686 -0.567 
 
 
 
(2.756) (0.844) (1.982) (2.789) 
PolStab -4.045*** -1.057** -3.749** -4.453* 
 
(1.417) (0.429) (1.793) (2.680) 
GDP -1.093 
   
 
(0.949) 
   OPEN 
 
-0.007 
  
  
(0.004) 
  VA 
  
-2.049** 
 
   
(0.987) 
 Corrupt 
   
-0.0299 
    
(0.032) 
     Observations 845 476 849 770 
Countries 122 68 122 114 
R-squared 0.035 0.047 0.037 0.029 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; constant is included but not 
reported 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Is there an interaction effect of the shadow economy on political stability? 
Cross sectional regressions: Pooled Least Squares 
Dependent variable = inflation 
 1 2 3 4 
Shadow 3.432** 5.471*** 4.134*** 3.163*** 
 
(1.368) (0.657) (0.722) (1.079) 
 
 
PolStab 0.861 -0.003 2.292* 0.923 
 
(0.886) (0.386) (1.194) (0.805) 
Shadow*PolStab -5.128** -1.126* -6.209*** -5.533* 
 
(2.098) (0.604) (2.308) (2.975) 
GDP -1.112 
   
 
(0.954) 
   OPEN 
 
-0.00715 
  
  
(0.00446) 
  VA 
  
-2.265** 
 
   
(1.023) 
 Corrupt 
   
-0.0463 
    
(0.0344) 
Observations 845 476 849 770 
Countries 122 68 122 114 
R-squared 0.037 0.047 0.039 0.03 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; constant is included but not 
reported. 
 
     
Table 2.1 Marginal effects for the interaction term above (with same 
controls as previous)      
      Shadow  4.88*** 5.69*** 5.89*** 4.58*** 
 
(1.112) (0.641) (0.986) (0.941) 
 PolStab  -3.80** -1.00** -3.35** -4.06* 
 
(1.323) (0.405) (1.669) (2.473) 
     
Delta method standard errors are reported in parenthesis for the marginal effects 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Discussion 
Political stability is an important determinant of inflation because less stable 
governments are more inclined to use the inflation tax; firstly because of their tendency to 
use inefficient economic policies, and secondly because they are prone to using debt 
accumulation as a strategic tool to constrain future governments. The presence of a large 
 
 
shadow economy may enhance both likelihoods. The results in this study imply that 
inflation through debt accumulation and policy failure is likely to occur in an economy 
with (i) more shadow activity and (ii) less political stability. 
 In particular, inefficient or distortionary policies, as mentioned in 
Campillo and Miron (1997) and Acemoglu et al. (2008) may be revisited in the context of 
inflation given that the size of the shadow economy changes the role of political stability. 
In the same vein, the tendency of outgoing regimes to strategically constrain incoming 
governments through a debt burden may also be appraised differently where and when a 
large shadow economy is present.  
The above contentions may be examined in more depth by emphasizing the 
mechanism through which the shadow economy fuels inflation; thus the hypothesis that 
political stability is more likely to be an important indicator of inflation in countries 
where a large shadow economy is present.  
These predictions are supported by empirical evidence derived through the use of 
an econometric model and panel dataset covering over 100 countries over the 1999 – 
2007 time period. Both political stability and shadow economy size have an effect on 
inflationary tendencies. This is apparent from a quick analysis of the marginal effects of 
these variables. It is of course important to mention that the shadow economy has a 
stronger effect.  
The empirical results indicate that political stability might have a moderating 
effect on the relationship between the shadow economy and inflation. The first set of 
estimates corroborates the literature that shows an inverse relationship between political 
stability and inflation; the second set of estimates reveals that this same relationship 
might not remain intact when the interaction effect of the shadow economy and political 
stability is considered. This implies that the association between political stability and 
inflation relies on the size of the shadow economy. 
  
Conclusion 
Among the contributions that this study hopes to make is the finding that inflation 
is the result not only of both the shadow economy and political stability, but that there is 
an interaction effect between the two variables. This observation provides the basis for 
some assumptions about economies that tend to be less politically stable; they are more 
 
 
prone to higher inflation, and that when this is the case, it is likely to be an outcome of 
shadow economy activity which, as noted in the existing literature, causes policymakers 
to rely on the inflation tax to meet revenue requirements. Political stability of course also 
makes it less likely that governments will use debt accumulation and its inflationary 
tendencies as a tool to constrain their successors. When the debt burden is manipulated 
for political purposes, it is likely that the size of the shadow economy will influence the 
extent to which governments are constrained by it. 
Such conclusions are relevant from the standpoint of public policy and contribute 
to the literature on the inflationary impacts of the shadow economy. These findings imply 
that policy makers may have to address the effects of political factors and/or the main 
drivers of the shadow economy in order to control inflation. 
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Appendix 1: Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Description Source Abbreviation 
used in 
STATA 
Notes 
Inflation Annual percentages of 
average consumer prices 
are year-on-year 
changes. 
IMF WEO 
September 
2011 
inflation Dependent 
variable. 
Variable of 
interest. 
Shadow 
economy 
Shadow economy as a 
percentage of GDP 
Schneider et al. 
(2010) 
estimates 
Shadow Used to 
construct dummy 
variable to 
represent 
economies with 
large shadow 
economies. 
Variable of 
interest. 
Political Stability Measures perceptions of 
the likelihood that the 
government will be 
destabilized or 
overthrown by 
unconstitutional means. 
World 
Governance 
Indicators 
2012 
PolStab Variable of 
interest. 
GDP Gross domestic product 
based on purchasing-
power-parity (PPP) per 
capita GDP. 
IMF WEO 
September 
2013 
GDP Used in 
logarithmic form 
as a control 
variable. 
Openness Ratio of imports plus 
exports to GDP. 
Penn World 
Tables 7 
OPEN Control variable 
Control of 
Corruption 
Uses Transparency 
International’s 
Perceptions Index (CPI) 
which is based on a 10-
point scale. Higher score 
indicates less corruption 
and the lowest score 
indicates very corrupt 
govt. 
Heritage Corrupt Control variable 
 
 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Captures perceptions of 
the extent to which a 
country's citizens are 
able to participate in 
selecting their 
government, as well as 
freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, 
and a free media. 
World 
Governance 
Indicators 
2011 
VA Control variable 
 
Appendix 2 Shadow economy taxonomy taken from Schneider (2012) 
 
 
